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THE TIERING OF IMPACT STATEMENTS-CAN
THE PROCESS BE STOPPED HALFWAY?
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19691 (NEPA) ushered
in a new era in administrative decisionmaking by requiring federal
agencies to consider the environmental consequences of their ac-
tions.2 NEPA mandates that federal decisionmakers prepare detailed
environmental impact statements (EIS) for all "major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."3 The
proper scope4 of an EIS is a major source of NEPA controversy.'
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
2. Section 102(2)(B) directs federal agencies to "identify and develop methods
and procedures . . .which will insure that presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking
along with economic and technical considerations." Id § 4332(2)(B) (1976).
For arguments that NEPA has been ineffectual in actually changing agency deci-
sionmaking, see Hill and Ortolano, NEPA "s Effect on the Consideration of Alterna-
tives. A Crucial Test, 18 NAT. RES. J. 285 (1978) (NEPA's effect on agency
consideration of alternatives has been negligible); Ingram, Information Channels and
Enpironmental Decisionmaking, 13 NAT. RES. J. 150, 164 (1973) (agencies are reluc-
tant to include in impact statement information likely to produce conflict or hinder
decisionmaking); Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 245
(1973) (significant self-reform by agencies will not be forthcoming under NEPA as
currently enforced and structured). But see 6 COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY ANN.
REP. 628 (1975) (NEPA has proven workable and has affected all levels of agency
planning and decisionmaking). See generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS
246-74 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]; W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW 712-13 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RODGERS].
3. NEPA, § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). An EIS must cover:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id
Federal agencies must follow the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regula-
tions on EIS preparation. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1980).
4. The CEQ defines scope as the "range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be
considered in an environmental impact statement." 40 C.F.R § 1508.25 (1980). The
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The process of tiering6 is emerging as a method for resolving scope
problems relating to certain ongoing multi-stage programs or poli-
cies.7 Tiering involves sequential preparation of impact statements
proper scope of an EIS is to be determined first by agency consideration of three types
of actions: connected, cumulative, and similar. Actions satisfying the criteria for con-
nected or cumulative designation warrant single EIS treatment. Similar actions, de-
fined as those which have similarities such as common geography or timing, should
be discussed in the same EIS when that is the best way to consider their combined
impact. An agency must next consider three types of alternatives to the proposed
action: none available, other reasonable alternatives, and mitigation measures. The
final factor for consideration in determining the proper scope of an EIS is the poten-
tial impact of the actions. The agency must determine if the impact will be direct,
indirect, or cumulative. Id
5. Numerous cases have considered scope issues. See notes 34 and 35 infra. See
generally RODGERS, supra note 2, at 785-92; Note, Approprlate Scope of an Environ-
mental Impact Statement: The Interrelationship of Impacts, 1976 DuKE L.J. 623.
6. The CEQ defines tiering as follows:
"Tiering" refers to the coverage of general matters in broader environmental
impact statements (such as national program or policy statements) with subse-
quent narrower statements or environmental analyses (such as regional or basin-
wide program statements or ultimately site-specific statements) incorporating by
reference the general discussions and concentrating solely on the issues specific to
the statement subsequently prepared.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1980).
Tiering is considered the appropriate manner of environmental impact study in two
situations. First, it is appropriate when a vertically constrictive sequence of state-
ments or analyses is involved. A broad program, plan, or policy EIS is to be prepared
first, followed by a program, plan, or policy EIS or Environmental Assessment (EA)
of a lesser scope and/or a site-specific EIS or EA. The second circumstance in which
tiering is appropriate is in the preparation of an EIS for a single action at an early
stage with a supplemental or subsequent EIS or EA prepared at a later stage. Id
This Comment focuses upon the first type of situation.
7. Courts have found a number of federal programs most efficiently studied
through the tiering process. See Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir.
1978) (Geothermal Leasing Program); County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562
F.2d 1368 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (Outer Continental Shelf
Oil and Gas Development); NRDC v. Administrator, Energy Research and Dev.
Adm'n, 451 F. Supp. 1245 (D.D.C. 1978), affdinpart, rev'd in part, vacated in part on
other grounds sub nom. NRDC v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 606
F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (radioactive nuclear waste storage); Kelley v. Butz, 404 F.
Supp. 925 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (Forest Service's spraying of chemical defoliants in na-
tional forests); NRDC v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aj'd, 527 F.2d
1386 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976) (Bureau of Land Management
licensing program under Taylor Grazing Act).
The CEQ recommends tiering for federal programs and policies because it will
eliminate repetitive consideration of the same issues and allow each EIS to focus
upon the specific issues ripe for decision at each stage of environmental analysis. 40
C.F.R. § 1502.20 (1980). This avoidance of redundancy in environmental review
should prove less costly and allow for more circumscribed decisionmaking. ANDER-
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from a broad programmatic" to a lesser9 or site-specific' ° scope. In
Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus," a federal district court allowed this pro-
cess of sequential preparation to stop halfway, with site-specific EIS
preparation obviated by the adequacy of earlier, broader EIS's.
In 1977, the Department of Interior (DOI) approved development
plans for two oil and gas drilling and production platforms on the
Outer Continental Shelf'2 of the Santa Barbara Channel. 3 Relying
SON, supra note 2, at 290. Furthermore, tiering should enhance NEPA's effectiveness
by requiring agency consideration of environmental impacts to begin at a higher level
and by encouraging earlier public involvement in the decisionmaking process. Gog-
gins, Some Suggestionsfor Future Plaintiffs on Extending the Scope of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 24 KAN. L. REv. 307, 324 (1975).
8. A programmatic or program EIS encompasses broad federal programs or poli-
cies at the planning stage. For a discussion of cases holding programmatic EIS's nec-
essary, see note 34 infra See generally Note, The Scope of the Program EIS
Requirement: The Needfor a Coherent Judicial Approach, 30 STAN. L. REv. 767
(1978) (suggesting judicial adoption of a three-part test for determining the proper
scope of a programmatic EIS). See also Note, Program En vironmental Impact State-
ments: Review andRemedies, 75 MICH. L. REv. 107 (1976); Comment, Planning Level
and Program Impact Statements Under the National Environmental Policy Act: A Def-
nitional Approach, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 124 (1975).
9. Like a programmatic EIS, a 'lesser scope' EIS covers an overall program, plan,
or policy, but merely does so at a narrower, more constrictive level. For example, a
regional EIS discussing oil and gas development in the Atlantic coastal area is a
tiered, lesser scope EIS as compared to a programmatic EIS covering Outer Continen-
tal Shelf (OCS) development nationwide. See County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Inte-
rior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1377 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978), discussed
in notes 53-59 and accompanying text infra. It is nonetheless programmatic, since its
scope encompasses more than an individual project.
10. An EIS of site-specific scope deals solely with a single, specific project. In the
context of multi-stage federal programs, site-specific EIS's appear subsequent to all
programmatic EIS's as the final tier of environmental review. They concentrate on
the specifics of the individual project, while summarizing and incorporating by refer-
ence relevant information from the programmatic EIS's. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (1980).
11. 477 F. Supp. 40 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
12. By authority of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1356 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, §§ 201-208, 92 Stat. 632, the Secretary of
the Interior has broad responsibility for administering oil and gas leasing and devel-
opment on the OCS. Within the DOI, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and
the United States Geological Survey (USGS) share this responsibility. The BLM ad-
ministers the leasing of particular tracts, 43 C.F.R. § 3300 (1979), while the USGS
supervises and regulates operations on the leased tracts. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1-.97 (1979).
13. The two platforms at issue were Sun Oil's Platform Henry and Chevron's
Platform Grace. Both are located in lease tracts initially purchased in 1968 in a
sealed-bid lease sale conducted by the BLM. See note 12 supra. Sun Oil submitted a
Development Plan for Platform Henry in 1969. As a result of the Santa Barbara oil
1980]
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upon earlier national and regional EIS's, 14 Environmental Assess-
spill of that year, however, all further OCS development off the California coast was
suspended indefinitely. R. EASTON, BLACK TIDE (1972). Following completion of a
number of environmental studies, the DOI extended the suspension in 1971 and rec-
ommended that Congress cancel the leases. The Ninth Circuit upheld this suspension
pending Congressional action in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 148 (9th
Cir. 1973). In light of the fact that the 92nd Congress adjourned in October, 1972
without acting, however, the court declared the suspension thereafter invalid. 493
F.2d at 149. Accord, Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 751 (9th Cir.
1975) (to the extent the DOI's suspension of activities under oil and gas leases relies
on permanent adverse environmental consequences, the suspension amounts to a can-
cellation of the leases beyond the Secretary's power).
In November, 1973, President Nixon initiated "Pioject Independence," a program
intended to free the United States from dependence upon foreign energy sources.
President's Address to the Nation Outlining Steps to Deal with the Emergency, 9
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1312, 1317 (Nov. 7, 1973). In 1974, as part of Project
Independence, the President directed the Secretary of the Interior to more than triple
the acreage leased on the OCS. President's Message to the Congress Outlining Legis-
lative Proposals and Executive Actions to Deal with the Crisis, 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PREs. Doc. 72, 84 (Jan. 23, 1974). The DOI, however, was to ensure observation of
environmental safeguards. Id
In response to the President's directive, the DOI published a nationwide program-
matic EIS in 1975. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATE-
MENT, PROPOSED INCREASE IN OIL AND GAS LEASING ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF (1975) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL EIS]. Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus, 477
F. Supp. 40, 44 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1979). That EIS, together with a lease sale EIS for the
Southern California OCS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
STATEMENT, OCS SALE No. 35 OFFSHORE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, FES 75-35
(1975), was held to satisfy NEPA's requirements for allowing a lease sale to take place
in California ex rel Younger v. Morton, 404 F. Supp. 26, 32 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See
generally McDermott, Expanded Offshore Leasing and the Mandates of NEP,4, 10
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 531 (1977). See also Southern Cal. Ass'n of Gov'ts v. Kleppe,
413 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1976).
A regional EIS for the Santa Barbara Channel was prepared in 1976: U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, OIL AND GAS DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL, FES 76-13 (1976). Get Oil Out, Inc. v.
Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 40, 44 n.l (C.D. Cal. 1979). It was following the preparation of
both the national and regional EIS's that the DOI finally approved Development
Plans for Platform Grace. The agency denied approval of Platform Henry until after
a judicial determination that continued rejection of Sun Oil's Development Plans
amounted to a breach of the oil company's lease. Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572
F.2d 786, 817 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
14. NATIONAL EIS, supra note 13; FES 76-13, supra note 13. The DOI also relied
upon a lesser scope EIS prepared prior to the programmatic EIS's: U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, PROPOSED INSTALLATION OF
PLATFORMS C AND HENRY ON FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES OCS-P 0241; AND
0240 ISSUED UNDER THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT, SANTA BARBARA
CHANNEL OFF THE COAST OF CALIFORNIA, FES 71-9 (1971). This EIS, covering the
lease tract containing Platform Henry, had been rejected by the Secretary of Interior
since its preparation in 1971. See Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 814 (Ct.
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ments15 prepared on the two proposed platforms, 6 and an EIS pre-
pared for a "similar" platform,' 7 the DOI determined site-specific
Cl. 1978). In 1972, the Secretary issued a "Statement of Decision" listing six reasons
for rejecting the EIS and Sun Oil's plans for development. Id at 801. The court in
Sun Oil criticized the Statement of Decision as a "post hoc rationalization" under
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). Sun Oil
Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d at 815. The court found the rejection unjustified, since
on the record installation of Platform Henry did not pose a threat to the Channel
environment. Accordingly, the Secretary did not have authority under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act or its implementing regulations to continually hold up
the lease. Id at 816-17. The court did not, however, pass judgment on the EIS. Its
validity had not been formally challenged; therefore, the court accepted its findings as
true.
Sun Oil was decided prior to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, §§ 201-208, 92 Stat. 632 (amending 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1356 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). Prior to amendment, the Secretary's power under the
Act's implementing regulations was limited to a temporary suspension in emergency
situations. 30 C.F.R. § 250.12 (1980). Under the Amendments, however, the Secre-
tary can permanently cancel a lease if, following a hearing arising from a temporary
suspension, he determines the benefits of cancellation outweigh those of allowing the
lease to continue in force. Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 204, 92 Stat. 636 (amending 43
U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)). A lease subject to termination must pose
serious harm to the environment which cannot be expected to disappear or apprecia-
bly decrease within a reasonable time. Id These Amendments, coupled with the fact
that the 1971 EIS covering Platform Henry was never the subject of judicial review,
effectively mitigate the precedential value of Sun Oil concerning the platforms at issue
in Get Oil Out. For a discussion of the Amendments and their possible impact upon
OCS development, see Note, Environmental Considerations in Federal Oil and Gas
Leasing on Outer Continental Shelf, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 399, 407-09 (1979).
15. An Environmental Assessment (EA) is a public document prepared by a fed-
eral agency which presents adequate environmental evidence and analysis for deter-
mining whether an EIS is necessary. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1980). The agencies can
establish their own procedures for EA preparation. Id § 1507.3. Under the USGS's
regulations for OCS development, the agency supervisor prepares an EA prior to ap-
proval of a proposed or significantly revised exploration or production and develop-
ment plan. 30 C.F.R. § 250.34-4 (1979).
16. The USGS prepared a detailed EA for each platform. These described the
proposed platforms and considered their environmental impacts both under normal
operating conditions and in the event of accidents, such as oil spills. Get Oil Out, Inc.
v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 40, 44 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
In an earlier decision on this case, the district court rejected both EA's as inade-
quate. Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus, 468 F. Supp. 82, 86 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The court
remanded the matter to the DOI for preparation of a statement of reasons explaining
its decision that EIS's were unnecessary. Id Prior to rehearing, the DOI prepared
the required statements of reasons as well as a joint EA/Environmental Impact Re-
port with the State of California. 477 F. Supp. at 44.
17. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, PRO-
POSED PLAN OF DEVELOPMENT, SANTA YNEZ UNIT, SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL, OFF
1980)
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EIS's were not necessary.'" Get Oil Out, Inc., a California environ-
mental group, objected. Contending there was a strong likelihood
the platforms would have significant impacts, 9 the group argued that
a full determination could only be made through site-specific EIS
preparation. The district court found that the DOI had not reached
its decision in an unreasonable or arbitrary and capricious manner.2 0
CALIFORNIA, FES 74-20 (1974). Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. at 44, 44
n. 1.
18. The DOI based its decision upon a determination that neither platform would
have a significant impact upon the environment, and that, even if either did, site-
specific EIS's would still be unnecessary "because the environmental impacts of a
platform similar to the one[s] proposed have been comprehensively analyzed and de-
scribed in existing EIS's." U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GRACE STATEMENT OF
REASONS 29 (1979), quoted in Plaintiffs' Memorandum for Renewed Motion for Par-
tial Summary Judgment at 2, Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 40 (C.D. Cal.
1979) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Memorandum]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
HENRY STATEMENT OF REASONS 28 (1979), quotedin Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra,
at 2.
19. Plaintiffs contended that "each plan has or, at the least, may have, significant
impacts on the human environment" not adequately analyzed in any existent envi-
ronmental study. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 18, at 3. Plaintiffs feared a
number of potentially significant environmental impacts. Of primary concern was the
possibility that the structures could have adverse geologic impacts in the seismic
channel, resulting in earthquake shaking, fault rupture, or other hazards which could
in turn lead to an oil spill. Id at 18-19. Plaintiffs also suggested air pollution, the
elimination of fishing grounds, aesthetic impacts, and effects upon cultural resources
such as Indian remains and shipwrecks believed to be in the area as objections to
developmental approval prior to site-specific EIS preparation. Id at 21-31.
20. 477 F. Supp. at 41-42. Plaintiffs had argued that in the Ninth Circuit the
standard of review of agency threshold determinations that a proposed action will not
significantly affect the quality of the human environment (negative determinations) is
one of reasonableness. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 18, at 4. Plaintiffs based
this contention upon City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 1975)
(threshold test is whether agency has "reasonably concluded" project will not have
significant adverse environmental consequences). Defendants averred that the
Supreme Court overruled the 'reasonableness' standard in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390 (1976), substituting it with the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970). Memorandum of Intervenors
Supporting Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Joining
Therein at 3, Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 40 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The
district court in Get Oil Out, recognizing that the discussion of standard of review in
Klefppe was dicta, refrained from deciding which was the proper standard. It implied,
however, that the Ninth Circuit standard continued to be reasonableness. 477 F.
Supp. at 43.
One district court within the Ninth Circuit has, since Kleppe, applied the reasona-
bleness standard. City and County of San Francisco v. United States, 443 F. Supp.
1116, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1977). For general discussions of the standard of review for
negative determinations, see Comment, Judicial Review of a NEPA Negative State-
[Vol. 20:197
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21It held, therefore, that site-specific EIS's were not necessary. The
projects could proceed upon the basis that the earlier, broad EIS's
and the project Environmental Assessments constituted adequate
compliance with NEPA.
An EIS primarily serves an "action-forcing" function, 3 ensuring
"fully informed and well-considered" agency decisions24 reached af-
ter consideration of environmental consequences.2 5 Although federal
agencies must comply with the EIS requirement "to the fullest extent
possible,"26 they are not to elevate environmental considerations
above other appropriate but competing concerns.27 NEPA mandates
a balancing analysis, 8 not a particular result.2 9 In order to protect
ment, 53 B.U. L. Rnv. 879 (1973); Comment, Threshold Determinations by Federal
Agencies Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q.
235.
21. 477 F. Supp. at 42.
22. Id.
23. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1979); Atlanta Coalition on
Transp. Crisis, Inc. v. Atlanta Regional Comm'n, 599 F.2d 1333, 1344 (5th Cir. 1979).
The term "action-forcing" originated in the Senate during consideration of the provi-
sions which became § 102(2)(C) of NEPA. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969)
(remarks of Sen. Jackson).
24. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
25. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980); Swain v. Brinegar, 542 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1976). See McGarity, The
Courts, the Agencies, and NEFA Threshold Issues, 55 Tux. L. REV. 801, 804 (1977)
(NEPA's overall purpose is to compel agency consideration of environmental conse-
quences).
26. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). The requirement that NEPA's § 102
procedural mandates be followed "to the fullest extent possible" came out of confer-
ence. The phrase was not meant to restrict the Act's broad scope and force. See, e.g.,
Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the Senate, 115 CONG. REC. 40417-18 (1969);
Provisions of the Conference Substitute, 115 CONG. REc. 39702-04 (1969). The
Supreme Court has recognized that the phrase "is a deliberate command that the duty
NEPA imposes upon the agencies to consider environmental factors not be shunted
aside in the bureaucratic shuffle." Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426
U.S. 776, 787 (1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). See also Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (the phrase does not make compliance with NEPA discretion-
ary).
27. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980). See note 28 infra.
28. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (NEPA requires a case-by-case bal-
ancing analysis). It is open to speculation whether the Supreme Court's per curiam
opinion in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980),
overrules the NEPA balancing analysis enunciated in Calvert Cliffs' and numerous
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the discretionary domain of the executive, judicial review of an
subsequent cases. E.g., NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Chau-
tauqua County Envt'l Defense Council v. Adams, 452 F. Supp. 376, 380 (W.D. N.Y.
1978); Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 927 (D. Or.
1977). Broadly interpreted, the Strycker's Bay Court's statement that "the only role
for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental conse-
quences," can be read as precluding all substantive review of the agency's decision.
444 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); N. ORLOFF & G. BROOKS, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT: CASES AND MATERIALS 307 (1980).
Such an interpretation of the Court's language is, however, far too broad. Since
Calvert Cliffs', courts have generally adopted a limited substantive standard of judi-
cial review, ensuring reasonable good faith compliance with NEPA's procedural man-
dates. See, e.g., Monroe County Conserv. Council, Inc. v. Adams, 566 F.2d 419, 422
(2d Cir. 1977) (court may determine whether EIS was prepared in objective good
faith, permitting full consideration and balancing of environmental factors); Carolina
Envt'l Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (EIS
must be completed in objective good faith, allowing full consideration and balancing
of environmental factors; agency officials, however, can be subjectively impartial);
Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974) (EIS must contain a
reasonably thorough discussion of probable significant environmental impacts). A
number of circuit courts of appeals have formulated this standard in terms of a "rule
of reason." See County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289,
1299 (8th Cir. 1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers (Ten-
nessee-Tombigbee), 492 F.2d 1123, 1131 (5th Cir. 1974); National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1002 n.5 (10th Cir. 1973); NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
Under the broad interpretation of Strycker'r Bay, which views the Court's use of
the word "consider" as meaning a mere mechanical observation that the agency
looked at environmental factors, even these limited standards of review would be
impermissible. A court could not apply the rule of reason to determine if the agency
complied with NEPA in good faith; it could merely ask whether, on its face, the rec-
ord showed the agency mechanically complied. It is unlikely the Court meant the
word to have such a potentially debilitating impact upon NEPA, given its extensive
reliance upon its earlier opinions in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21
(1976) (court may ensure agency took a "hard look" at environmental factors), and
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 555 (1978) (court has
a limited role in reviewing the sufficiency of the agency's environmental considera-
tion).
In one post-Strycker's Bay opinion, the First Circuit, in Grazing Fields Farm v.
Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068 (1st Cir. 1980), adopted a two-part substantive and pro-
cedural standard of judicial review under NEPA. Id at 1071-72. Citing Strycker's
Bay, the court stated in part that a court should engage in a limited substantive re-
view to ensure the agency gave a good faith consideration to environmental factors.
Id at 1072. The court read Strycker's Bay as merely reasserting the rule that a court
may not second guess the substantive balancing judgment struck by the agency. Id at
1072, 1072 n.2. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368,
1376 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying good faith compliance/reasonable discussion stan-
dard of review, though making no reference to Strycker's Bay).
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agency's decision is therefore limited to ensuring that the agency took
a "hard look" at environmental consequences.3 °
Agencies possess wide latitude in EIS preparation.31 The scope
and detail required for each EIS depends upon the type of "major
federal action"' 32 proposed.33 Agency programs comprising numer-
ous individual projects or segments often require broad, program-
matic EIS's;34 the program itself constitutes a major federal action.
29. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978);
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 345 (D.D.C. 1980).
30. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). The "hard look" doc-
trine of judicial review in NEPA cases originated in NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
838 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The District of Columbia Circuit stated that courts should not
"impose unreasonable extremes" upon federal agencies attempting to comply with
NEPA "[s]o long as the officials and agencies have taken the 'hard look' at environ-
mental consequences mandated by Congress." Id Numerous courts have subse-
quently adopted the phrase. Eg., Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP II), 422 U.S. 289, 327 n.28
(1975) (proper scope of judicial review of EIS need not be determined since agency
adequately gave environmental matters a "hard look"); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. United
States EPA, 460 F. Supp. 248,251 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (EIS clearly shows environmental
impacts were given a "hard look"). See generally Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont
Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699, 704-08 (1979).
31. See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619
F.2d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 1980) (agencies have flexibility with respect to timing of EIS
preparation); NRDC v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1261, 1272
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (agencies have "substantial discretion" in determining which alterna-
tives to discuss and adopt); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers
(Tennessee-Tombigbee), 492 F.2d 1123, 1139 n.33 (5th Cir. 1974) (decision whether to
take a particular action is "broadly committed" to agency discretion). But see Wyo-
ming Outdoor Coordinating Counsel v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973)
(agency latitude in deciding whether EIS is necessary is limited; must be reasonable
regarding NEPA's standards and requirements).
32. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). The EIS requirement ap-
plies only to "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." Id
33. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures (SCRAP II), 422 U.S. 289, 322 (1974) (in deciding what kind of EIS to pre-
pare, it is necessary first to describe accurately the federal action being taken).
Accord, Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 560 (10th Cir. 1977) (EIS must be tai-
lored to the federal action).
34. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368 (10th
Cir. 1980) (Prototype Oil Shale Leasing Program); Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d
1162 (9th Cir. 1978) (federal Geothermal Leasing Program); Save Our Sycamore v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 576 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1978) (metropolitan
area rapid transit system); County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (OCS leasing program); NRDC v.
United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 539 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated, 434 U.S.
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When an individual project within the program is also a major fed-
eral action, a lesser or site-specific EIS may be necessary.35 Problems
arise when both a program and its component parts are major federal
actions and the agency determines EIS's are not required for both.
In one of the first cases to deal with this issue, the district court in
NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) v. TVA 36 upheld the
adequacy of a single programmatic EIS concerning long-term coal
contracts. The court found that the TVA acted rationally in rejecting
the argument that NEPA requires individual EIS's for each term coal
contract.37 Underlying this rational basis was a statutory conflict
prohibiting individual EIS preparation for each contract.3" In addi-
1030 (1978) (wide-scale use of radioactive mixed oxide fuel); NRDC v. Callaway, 524
F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975) (cumulative impact of individual Navy dumping and dredging
projects); Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program); Jones v. Lynn,
477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973) (entire urban renewal project); Named Individual Mem-
bers of San Antonio Conserv. Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.
1971) (entire stretch of highway, not artificially chopped segments); Kettle Range
Conserv. Group v. Bergland, 480 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Wash. 1979) (national forest
timber sale); NRDC v. Hodel, 435 F. Supp. 590 (D. Or. 1977) (long-range electrical
power program); NRDC v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D. D.C. 1974), aj'd, 527 F.2d
1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (federal livestock grazing program); NRDC v. TVA, 367 F.
Supp. 122, supplemented, 367 F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), ajfd, 502 F.2d 852 (6th
Cir. 1974) (TVA coal procurement program). See generally RODGERS, supra note 2, at
785-90.
35. Eg., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 356 F. Supp. 131, 139
(N.D. Cal. 1973), supplementing 352 F. Supp. 50, aff'd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1041 (1974) ("So long as each major federal action is under-
taken individually and not as an indivisible, integral part of an integrated state-wide
system, then the requirements of NEPA are determined on an individual major fed-
eral action basis"). See generally RODGERS, supra note 2, at 790-92.
36. 367 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), supplemented, 367 F. Supp. 128, a i'd, 502
F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1974).
37. Id at 128.
38. Id at 125. Section 104 of NEPA states that its provisions are not to affect the
specific statutory obligations of federal agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1976). The
Supreme Court has held that conflicts between NEPA and specific statutes governing
federal agencies must be resolved in favor of the agency statute. Flint Ridge Dev. Co.
v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1975) (where there is a clear and unavoida-
ble conflict in statutory authority, NEPA must yield); United States v. Students Chal-
lenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP I), 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973) (NEPA
is not to repeal by implication any other statute). But see Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Matthews, 410 F. Supp. 336, 337 (D. D.C. 1976) (to extent reconcilable
with other statutory duties, NEPA supplements them).
In NRDC v. TVA, the court found that EIS preparation for each contract would
violate § 9(b) of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 16 U.S.C. § 83 1h(b) (1976).
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tion, however, the court found the programmatic EIS itself satisfied
NEPA's requirements. 9
The Supreme Court endorsed programmatic EIS's in Kleppe v.
Sierra Club.' In a case where the agency had already prepared
programmatic and site-specific EIS's,4 1 the Court determined that a
middle-tier regional EIS was unnecessary. 42 The Court held that
NEPA applies neither to the mere contemplation of major federal
action43 nor to the existence of intimately related projects;" the EIS
requirement extends only toproposed major federal actions.45 Since
there was no evidence of a regional development plan,' there was no
Section 9(b) requires the TVA to hold advertised open bidding for all contracts for
services or supplies. Id Due to extreme fluctuation in prices in the coal market, the
court reasoned that individual contract EIS preparation would limit the number of
companies capable of bidding to the few large enough to afford the extended process-
mg time EIS preparation would require. 367 F. Supp. at 125-26.
39. 367 F. Supp. 128, 131 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), supplementing 367 F. Supp. 122,
aft'd, 502 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1974).
40. 427 U.S. 390, 409-10 (1976).
41. The DOI had prepared site-specific EIS's for four coal mining plans in the
Powder River Basin as well as a nationwide Coal Programmatic EIS. Id at 395, 398.
Respondents contended that a middle-tier "Northern Great Plains region" EIS was
necessary as well. Id at 395.
42, Id at 399.
43. Id at 406.
44. Id. at 414.
45. Id at 401. Accord, Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 362 (1979) (EIS re-
quirement applies to those recommendations and reports which actually propose
programmatic action, not to those merely suggesting how to fund such actions); Aber-
deen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP II), 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975) (agency must have EIS ready at the time it
makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for major federal action). Kleppe
has been thoroughly analyzed in numerous law review articles. See generally Mc-
Garity, The Courts, the Agencie, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 Tax. L. Rnv. 801,
824-35, 884-86 (1977); Note, The Scope of the Program EIS Requirement The Need
for a Coherent Judicial Approach , 30 STAN. L. REV. 767, 785-92 (1978).
46. The Court found no evidence in the record of a proposal for action at the
regional level. 427 U.S. at 400. The court of appeals, however, which had ruled a
regional EIS was necessary, concluded that a regional plan was "contemplated." Si-
erra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In reaching a conclusion
accepted by Justice Marshall in dissent, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted a
four-part test for determining whether a contemplated program is "ripe, for EIS
preparation. Id at 880. This test involves examining (1) the likelihood of the pro-
gram coming to fruition, (2) the present availability of meaningful information on its
environmental effects and alternatives, (3) the extent to which irretrievable commit-
ments are being made, and (4) the severity of environmental impacts if the program is
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
need for a corresponding EIS.47 Although the court was enigmatic
concerning tiering, its decision did not question the rectitude of
multi-tiered EIS's. The Court implied that for certain ongoing fed-
eral programs, the preparation of sequential, tiered EIS's may be re-
quisite.48
Numerous lower federal courts have articulated tests to determine
whether preparation of either a programmatic or component EIS su-
persedes need for the other.49 In NRDC v. Morton, the district
court determined that a- programmatic EIS standing alone is ade-
implemented. Id The Supreme Court rejected this test as an unauthorized departure
from NEPA's statutory language. 427 U.S. at 406.
47. 427 U.S. at 401. See also Peshlakai v. Duncan, 476 F. Supp. 1247, 1258 (D.
D.C. 1979) (regional EIS required only if there is a regional comprehensive federal
plan or a number of major federal actions in the region with cumulative or synergistic
effects).
48. The Court stated:
[NEPA] speaks solely in terms ofproposed actions; it does not require an agency
to consider the possible environmental impacts of less imminent actions when
preparing the impact statement on proposed actions. Should contemplated ac-
tions later reach the stage of actual proposals, impact statements on them will
take into account the effect of their approval upon the existing environment; and
the condition of that environment presumably will reflect earlier proposed ac-
tions and their effects.
427 U.S. at 410 n.20. (Emphasis in original).
49. E.g., NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 1975) (court relied upon
geographical proximity, interrelatedness of action, and similarity of environmental
effects to determine that the projects at issue were closely enough related to create a
cumulative environmental impact warranting programmatic EIS preparation); Sierra
Club v. Callaway (Wallisville Dam), 499 F.2d 982, 990 (5th Cir. 1974) (programmatic
EIS necessary if a strong enough logical nexus exists between individual project and
overall program); Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D.
Md. 1973), ajfdper curiam, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974) (programmatic EIS necessary
only if first, there is nominal federal consideration of treating the individual actions as
a unit, and second, a logical nexus exists); Environmental Defense Fund v. Arm-
strong, 352 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1972), supplemented, 356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal.
1972), affd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973) (programmatic EIS unnecessary if each ma-
jor federal action is undertaken individually and is not an indivisible part of an inte-
grated system). A number of courts have held a programmatic EIS is not necessary if
each project has "independent utility." See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d
1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973).
Cf Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105 (D. N.H. 1975) (in-
dependent significance). See generally RODGERS, supra note 2, at 788-89.
50. 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976). At
issue in NRDC v. Morton was the Bureau of Land Management's livestock grazing
permit program. The district court held the Bureau's programmatic EIS insufficient,
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quate if it satisfies two criteria. First, the agency must analyze local
geographic conditions in sufficient detail to permit consideration of
the environmental impacts of and alternatives to each individual ma-
jor federal action within the program." Second, the contents must be
detailed enough to allow particularized public evaluation and com-
ment on the individual projects. 2
In County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior,53 the Second Circuit
effectively established Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas develop-
ment as an ongoing program requiring tiered EIS preparation under
Kleppe. The court determined the DOI should prepare a series of
constrictive EIS's, beginning at a national programmatic level, nar-
rowing first to a regional and finally to a Development Plan scope.54
Ruling upon the adequacy of a regional EIS,5 5 the court held that
discussion of proper transportation routes could be deferred 56 until
final-tier EIS preparation. 7 The court reasoned in part that there
51. 388 F. Supp. at 838-39.
52. Id at 839. For a favorable appraisal of this two-part test, see McGarity, The
Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. L. REv. 801, 836 (1977).
53. 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
54. Id at 1377. The court determined that NEPA first requires the DOI to pre-
pare a national programmatic EIS discussing its decision for accelerating the OCS
leasing program. Second, the agency must decide which specific offshore areas should
be offered for lease and prepare regional EIS's for each. Finally, Development Plan
EIS's discussing the particular environmental consequences of each tract are neces-
sary prior to agency approval of any specific proposals for production and transporta-
tion of oil and gas. Id The Second Circuit did not discuss whether or not site-
specific EIS's for each platform would be necessary. The court implied transportation
and production could begin following completion of tract level EIS's. Nothing the
court said precludes preparation for each platform, however, since that issue was not
before the court. For a critical discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis, see Com-
ment, Offshore Oil Development andthe Demise ofNEPA, 7 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV.
83 (1978).
55. The DOI had prepared a regional EIS for the Atlantic coastal area as well as a
programmatic EIS for OCS development nationwide. Plaintiffs contended the re-
gional EIS was insufficient for allowing exploration activities because it did not ade-
quately discuss possible transportation routes. The EIS assumed oil would be
pipelined to shore; plaintiffs, however, argued that the possibility of state and local
government refusal to permit pipeline landings upon their shores made it requisite
that the alternative of tankering be discussed. 562 F.2d at 1374.
56. The Second Circuit reasoned that the acceptability of deferring examination
of development and production problems in a middle-tier EIS depends upon (1)
whether it is "meaningfully possible" to obtain additional detailed information about
the subject at that stage, and (2) how important it is to gather the information at that
stage in deciding whether to continue the project. Id at 1378.
57. Id at 1382. The court based its decisiQn upon four factors. First, the project
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was no need to make that determination at the regional stage since
the permitted exploration activities would not involve an irrevocable
and irreversible commitment of public resources. 58  Furthermore,
any such discussion would be purely speculative, and thus properly
postponed until more precise data became available.5 9
The Ninth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Hathaway6" dealt with a situa-
tion similar to County of Suffolk under the federal Geothermal Leas-
ing Program.6' Relying heavily upon Kleppe, the court held that a
programmatic EIS would suffice for the initial "casual use" explora-
tion stage of geothermal resource development.62 The court based
this holding upon several factors. First, regional or site-specific de-
velopment within the Geothermal Leasing Program was still at the
contemplation stage; it did not qualify, under Kleppe, as a proposal
for major federal action.63 Second, by permitting "casual use," the
DOI had not made a "critical agency decision" leading to an irrevers-
ible and irretrievable commitment of resources.64 Third, the district
court was closely supervising all exploration activities to ensure
could be modified or changed in the future should grave environmental hazards
emerge. Id at 1378. Second, the government retained overall control over the pro-
gram possessing the power to make necessary modifications in the future. Id Third,
any discussion of pipeline routes at the regional stage was purely conjectural since it
was still unknown where, by whom, and what type oil was to be found. 1d at 1379.
Finally, the DOI was permitting only exploration activities; an irrevocable and irre-
versible commitment of resources was not being made. Id at 1390-91.
58. Id at 1390-91. See NEPA § 102(2)(C)(v), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1976).
See also Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978)
(middle-tier EIS on Operating Orders not required for lease sale to take place; consid-
erable environmental impact from the Orders can arise only after lease sale has been
held and its consideration can be deferred until after that time).
59. 562 F.2d at 1378.
60. 579 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1978).
61. In Hathaway, plaintiff environmental group sought to enjoin the DOI from
executing lease agreements giving private parties the right to explore for and commer-
cially produce geothermal steam within the Alvord Desert of southeast Oregon. The
agency had prepared a programmatic EIS covering the Geothermal Leasing Program
nationwide. The Alvord Desert, a known geothermal resource area, was under con-
sideration for designation as a roadless primitive and/or wilderness area. Plaintiffs
contended a regional EIS was necessary, and accordingly sought a preliminary in-
junction halting all geothermal activity until its preparation. Id at 1166.
62. Id at 1169.
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agency compliance with its regulations.65 Moreover, there was every
indicaticn that the agency intended to comply with NEPA at the ap-
propriate stage of development.66
In Get Oil Out, the court applied the "hard look" doctrine61 to find
that the DOI had satisfactorily complied with NEPA's procedural
mandates.6" The court was not free to decide whether the agency's
substantive determination of no significant environmental impact
was correct.69 It did not, therefore, pass judgment on the propriety of
a programmatic EIS superseding site-specific EIS preparation; rather,
it reached its conclusion by determining that the agency exercised its
discretion appropriately."0
Nevertheless, the implications of Get Oil Out upon tiering are sig-
nificant. Absent a statutory conflict as in NRDC v. TVA ,1 no previ-
ous tiering case involving an irreversible and irretrievable
commitment of resources had allowed the process to stop halfway.7 2
65. Id The court considered it important that there would be continuing federal
control over implementation of the leasing program. Id Accord, Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368, 1377 (10th Cir. 1980); Manygoats v.
Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1977).
66. 579 F.2d at 1167.
67. 477 F. Supp. at 43. For a discussion of the "hard look" doctrine, see note 30
supra.
68. 477 F. Supp. at 43.
69. The scope of judicial review under NEPA is limited. See notes 8-30 and ac-
companying text supra.
70. 477 F. Supp. at 45.
71. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
72. See notes 58 & 64 and accompanying text supra See also Mobil Oil Corp. v.
FTC, 562 F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1977) (EIS not necessary until the point where an
irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources is made); Friends of the Earth
v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1975) (scope of EIS does not depend upon the
interrelatedness of projects; rather it depends upon whether completion of one inevi-
tably leads to an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources at the other);
Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (timing of EIS depends in part upon extent irretrievable commit-
ments of resources are being made).
Subsequent to the Get Oil Ow decision, a district court determined that a program-
matic EIS covering the entire Black Hills National Forest made site-specific EIS's for
individual timber sales within the forest unnecessary. Vending v. Bergland, 479 F.
Supp. 174, 179 (D. S.D. 1979). Although the Forest Service determined that the indi-
vidual sales were not major federal actions significantly affecting the environment, the
court concluded that even if they were, site-specific EIS's would still be unnecessary.
Id The court stated: "where the programmatic EIS is sufficiently detailed and there
is no change in circumstances or departure from the policy in the programmatic EIS,
no useful purpose would be served by requiring a site-specific EIS." Id at 180.
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In fact, the decisions in both Hathaway and County of Suffolk rested
in part upon the fact that such a "critical agency decision" had not
been made.73 Moreover, the courts of appeals inferred in each case
that consideration of some environmental consequences can be de-
ferred only if agency compliance with NEPA at the appropriate later
stage may be expected. 4
The alleged EIS deficiencies in Hathaway and County of Suffolk
concerned tentative future actions of uncertain dimensions.71 The
platform construction at issue in Get Oil Out, on the other hand, com-
prised a specific imminent action with reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences. The resource commitment was not, as in County of Suffolk,
merely speculative. 76 Rather, it constituted a proposal for federal ac-
tion under KleppeY7
The district court in Get Oil Out found that the DOI had suffi-
ciently examined the possible environmental consequences of both
platform sites upon the resource commitment.78 The court accepted
the agency's finding that the proposed federal actions would not sig-
nificantly affect the environment.79 Part of the evidence relied upon
by the agency, however, creates doubt as to the adequacy of its exam-
ination and exemplifies one of the major problems inherent in the
process of tiering.
The DOI extended the process horizontally, basing its determina-
tion in part upon an EIS prepared for "a platform similar to the
one[s] proposed."' Tiering, however, is a vertical process.8 It is the
Should conditions or the policy significantly change, site-specific EIS's for future sales
would be required. Id
73. Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1978); County of Suf-
folk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1390-91 (2d Cir. 1977).
74. 579 F.2d at 1167; 562 F.2d at 1391. In County of Suffolk, the court stated:
"We are satisfied that the Department of Interior, which will have continuous control
over the venture, will deal with [these issues] thoroughly in the Development Plan
EIS before approving any plans. ... Id
75. 579 F.2d at 1168; 562 F.2d at 1378.
76. 562 F.2d at 1378.
77. See note 45 and accompanying text su.pra. The district court in Get 01 Out
did not directly address the question of whether the proposed federal action was "ma-
jor" under NEPA. The issue concerned the DOI's determination that the platforms
would not "significantly" affect the environment. 477 F. Supp. at 42.
78. 477 F. Supp. at 43-45.
79. Id at 43.
80. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GRACE STATEMENT OF REASONS at 29 (1979),
quotedin Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2; U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
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preparation of a series of constrictive EIS's in sequent order.8 2 As
stated in NRDC v. Morton, the sequence may be stopped halfway
only if the programmatic EIS sufficiently analyzes local geographic
conditions.83 Horizontal extension, as in Get Oil Out, violates this
sequence. The DOI avoided studying the environmental impact of a
particular project within a particular local geographical setting
through reliance upon an EIS prepared for a similar project within a
similar setting.
Tiering will undoubtedly play a significant role in future EIS prep-
aration. The Council on Environmental Quality regulations84 au-
thorize and encourage federal agency adherence to the process."
Tiering provides efficiency in EIS preparation by avoiding redun-
dancy. 6 Furthermore, it promises full and detailed environmental
assessments of multi-stage programs and policies, from the planning
stage through specific project development.8 7 As applied in Get Oil
Out, however, that promise becomes nothing more than an exercise
in empty rhetoric.8 For when applied horizontally, tiering under-
HENRY STATEMENT OF REASONS at 28 (1979), quoted in Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
supra note 17, at 2. (Emphasis added).
81. See notes 6-10 and accompanying text supra.
82. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1980); 43 Fed. Reg. 55978, 56006 (1978).
83. 388 F. Supp. 829, 838-39 (D.D.C. 1974). Cf. NRDC v. Administrator, Energy
Research and Dev. Adm'n, 451 F. Supp. 1245, 1259 (D. D.C. 1978), a'd in part, rev'd
in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nonz NRDC v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (sequence may stop only if
programmatic EIS contains all the environmental analysis required by NEPA).
84. Council on Environmental Quality: National Environmental Policy Act-
Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.00-1508.28 (1980). For a discussion of these regula-
tions as they apply to tiering, see notes 6-7 & 10 supra.
85. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (1980). Prior to issuance of the regulations in 1979, the
CEQ gave limited endorsement to tiering. See 2 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, 102 MONITOR 19 (1972).
86. 43 Fed. Reg. 55978, 55984 (1978). The CEQ contends tiering will provide
more focused, efficient EIS preparation. Id Furthermore, the process is seen as pro-
moting the Council's primary objectives of reducing paperwork and delay. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.4(i) (1980); 43 Fed. Reg. 55978-79, 55991 (1978). See note 7 supra.
87. See note 6 supra.
88. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir.
1980). In a case concerning the national Prototype Oil Shale Leasing Program, the
Tenth Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus found preparation of a single
'combination' programmatic, regional, and site-specific EIS satisfied NEPA's require-
ments. Id at 1382. The court relied in part upon assurances given the Secretary of
Interior by the program's area supervisor that the environmental impact had not
changed in the seven years since the EIS was prepared. Id at 1380-82. Judge Doyle,
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mines NEPA's basic purpose of ensuring that every proposal for ma-
jor federal action receive a detailed and independent environmdntal
study.
Douglas Lind
in concurrence, admitted that the agency's entire procedure constituted "an 'end run'
.. . designed to skirt NEPA as well as EIS." Id at 1383 (Doyle, J., concurring). He
nonetheless concurred in the result since he believed the energy crisis has made oil
shale development so crucial that "[i]t is too late to stand on [NEPA's] ceremony."
Id
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